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ARGUMENTS 
I. BOTH ESTABLISHED UTAH CASE LAW AND THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATE THAT TRIAL COUNSELS 
FAILURE TO REQUEST JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES CONSTITUTED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The State argues that "defense counsel's decision to forego 
lesser included offense instructions did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel where such instructions would 
have been inconsistent with Defendant's all-or-nothing defense at 
trial." See Brief of Appellee, pp. 11, 14-18. The record on 
appeal, Utah case law, and the applicable statutory provisions, 
demonstrate quite the contrary. 
As part of its argument, the State, without authority for 
such a proposition, implies that a defendant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the lesser included offense instruction. 
See Brief of Appellee, pp. 12-14. No such requirement applies to 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that are premised upon 
trial counsel's failure to request a lesser included offense jury 
instruction. Moreover, the State's argument is in direct conflict 
with the correction-of-error standard of review applied to claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 
25, %6, 89 P.3d 162 (stating that " [a]n ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
1 
question of law");1 State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 
376 (stating that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on 
direct appeal are reviewed "as a matter of law").2 
In the instant case, there was no reasonable basis for not 
requesting lesser included offense jury instructions. Rather, as 
demonstrated below, Mr. Terry had everything to lose and nothing 
to gain by precluding the jury from exercising the option to 
convict on lesser included offenses. Contrary to the State's 
argument, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did anything 
but consciously consider the possibility of instructing the jury 
concerning the lesser included offenses. At no time during the 
review of the proposed jury instructions did trial counsel either 
object or explain his strategical reasons for not requesting 
lesser included offense jury instructions (R. 601:62-77) . This is 
not a case like State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92, where 
the failure to object involved "more art than science." Id. at 
1|21. Rather, the decision not to request a particular jury 
'Both State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, %6, 89 P.3d 162 and the 
applicable standard of review are cited by the State in its Brief. 
See Brief of Appellee, pp. 1-2. 
2The State's argument is also inconsistent with the rules to be 
applied in cases such as this, namely, that the facts be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the defendant, and that "the requirements . 
. for the inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction 
requested by the defendant should be liberally construed." See State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986); State v. Spillers, 2005 UT 
App 283, 1(13; and State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986). 
2 
instruction concerning a lesser included offense involves 
objective factors and questions of law. 
The jury must be instructed concerning a lesser included 
offense if (1) the statutory elements of greater and lesser 
included offenses overlap to some degree, and (2) the evidence 
provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)); see also State v. Kell, 
2002 UT 106, H23, 61 P.3d 1019; State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, fl8, 
20 P.3d 888; State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986). 
Contrary to the State's argument, the court, in the course of 
making this determination, must view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the defendant. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 
(Utah 1986); see also State v. Spillers, 2005 UT App 283, fl3. 
Most importantly, perhaps, "the requirements . . . for the 
inclusion of a lesser included offense instruction requested by 
the defendant should be liberally construed." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 
424. 
The elements of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment, the crime with which Mr. Terry was 
3 
charged and convicted, are contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-3 7d-
4(1) (a) and 58-37d-5(l) (a),3 which state as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly or intentionally . . . possess a 
controlled substance precursor with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-
4(1) (a) . . . is guilty of a first degree 
felony if the trier of fact also finds any 
one of the following conditions occurred in 
conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; . . . . 
(e) conspire with or aid another to 
engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation . . . .4 
The elements of possession of a controlled substance precursor are 
alternatively set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (k) , 58-
37c-19(2), and 58-37c-20 (1) ,5 which state: 
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 
58-1-501 includes knowingly and intentionally 
. . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to 
possess any controlled substance precursor or 
any combination of controlled substance 
precursors knowing or having a reasonable 
cause to believe that the controlled 
substance precursor is intended to be used in 
3A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (2002) and 58-37d-5 (2002) 
is attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as Addendum D. 
4Without the possession-of-a-firearm condition, the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance precursor is a second-degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(2) (2002). 
5A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (2002), 58-37c-19 
(2002), and 58-37c-20 (2002) is attached to the previously filed 
Brief of Appellant as Addendum E. 
4 
the unlawful manufacture of any controlled 
substance.6 
• * * * 
Any person who is not licensed to engage 
in regulated transactions and not excepted 
from licensure is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor who, under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-
37c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1)(a): 
(a) possesses more than two ounces of 
crystal iodine; or 
(b) offers to sell, sells, or 
distributes crystal iodine to 
another. 
ie ic ic * 
Any person who is not licensed to engage 
in regulated transactions and not excepted 
from licensure who, under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-
37c-3 (12) (k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1) (a), 
possesses more than 12 grams of ephedrine or 
pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or 
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of 
these substances, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
According to established Utah case law, an offense is 
included in a greater offense when there is "some relationship" 
between them and "some overlap" in the proof that is required to 
establish the elements of both offenses. See State v. Pitts, 728 
P.2d 117, 116 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 
1983)). Not only is there is a close relationship between the 
6A violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) is a second-
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-ll(2) (2002). 
5 
enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors in the 
instant case, but there also is significant overlap in the 
elements of each offense. 
Notwithstanding the State's assertions, the evidence 
presented during trial provided a rational basis for the jury to 
acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment and then convict him of a lesser 
included offense of possession of a controlled substance precursor 
had those particular instructions been given (R. 601:24-35; R. 
601:82-92; R. 601:115-30). Based upon the facts before it, the 
jury could have rationally found that Mr. Terry, at best, merely 
possessed the controlled substance precursors of iodine and/or 
pseudoephedrine (See id.). Cf. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, %21
 f 
989 P.2d 1065. 
Further, trial counsel made no attempt, whatsoever, to 
request a jury instruction concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to 
commit the crime of either the enhanced crime of clandestine 
laboratory precursors and/or equipment and possession of 
controlled substance precursors.7 Utah law dictates that "a 
7In its Brief, the State made no attempt to rebut Mr. Terry's 
lesser included offense analysis. Consequently, for purposes of 
argument, the lesser included offenses set forth in both the Brief of 
Appellant and this Reply Brief are established. 
6 
person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
101(1) (2002). The facts of the instant case establish the 
necessary and appropriate circumstances that would have allowed 
the jury to rationally find that Mr. Terry's alleged solicitation 
of Mr. Archibald to purchase the controlled substance precursors 
actually constituted an attempt.8 
The failures of trial counsel to request jury instructions on 
the lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance 
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light 
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-1-402(3) and (4), Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. But for counsel's deficient 
performance of failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction, Mr. Terry would not have been convicted of the 
enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment. 
8A criminal attempt to commit a crime results in a one-step 
reduction of the charged crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(2) and 
(5) (2002) . 
7 
The State also argues that plain error does not apply to the 
instant case because the trial court has no independent duty to 
give a lesser included offense instruction if it is not requested. 
See Brief of Appellee, p. 18. However, this is directly 
contradicted by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2002), which states 
that the trial court is not "obligated to charge the jury with 
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense." (Emphasis added). 
The instant case provides a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting Mr. Terry of the enhanced crime of possession of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and then 
convicting him of a lesser included offense of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor. The record demonstrates that Mr. 
Terry was neither in actual nor constructive possession of the 
controlled substance precursors (R. 601::24-35; R. 601:82-92; R. 
601:115-30). Moreover, Mr. Terry was never in possession of any 
clandestine drug lab equipment (R. 601:204-18; cf. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-6 (2002)) . 
8 
II. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY 
FAILING TO ACCURATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY 
CONCERNING THE LAW AND ELEMENTS OF THE 
CHARGES APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
According to Utah law, the jury must be instructed with 
respect to all the legal elements it must find to convict a 
defendant of the crime so charged. State v. Jones, 823 P. 2d 1059, 
1061 (Utah 1991) . The absence of such an instruction is 
reversible error as a matter of law. Id. (citing State v. Laine, 
618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)). "The general rule is that an 
accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is 
essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." 
State v. .Roberts, 711 P. 2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine, 618 
P.2d at 35); see also State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 
1984). "Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never be 
harmless error." Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. 
A. Constructive Possession Instruction 
The State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective assistance 
challenge to the jury instruction defining constructive possession 
fails because the instruction is consistent with Utah law. See 
Brief of Appellee, pp. 2 0-22. Although the constructive 
possession jury instruction may have been consistent with Utah 
9 
law, the jury should not have been so instructed inasmuch as it 
did not apply to the facts of the instant case. 
Trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of his constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel by failing to object to 
Instruction No. 33,9 which was utilized to instruct the jury about 
the law of constructive possession. Utah law dictates that to 
prove constructive possession there must be a "sufficient nexus" 
between the accused and the controlled substance precursors to 
permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the controlled 
substance precursors. See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 1|l3, 985 
P.2d 911 (citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)). 
Hence, to establish constructive possession in the instant case, 
the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
controlled substance precursors "were subject to the defendant's 
dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to exercise 
that control." Id. at fl6 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318). 
According to the record in the instant case, no one but the 
police took possession, either actual or constructive, of the 
controlled substance precursors (R. 601:37-38; R. 601:129-30). In 
the instant case, the police incontestably and at all relevant 
9A true and correct copy of Jury Instruction No. 33 (R. 100) is 
attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as Addendum F. 
10 
times had direct custody, dominion, and control of the controlled 
substance precursors over which Mr. Terry allegedly had 
constructive possession. As a matter of impossibility, the State 
could not have proven that Mr. Terry constructively possessed the 
controlled substance precursors. The factual circumstances of the 
instant case, at the very most, constituted either an attempted 
constructive possession or an attempted conspiracy to possess the 
controlled substance precursors. 
The failure of trial counsel to object to Instruction No. 33 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case.10 But for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different in that Mr. 
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment. 
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." See State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 
(Utah 1981)).n Based upon established principles of plain error, 
the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
10See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e) . 
llSee Utah R. Crim. P. 19(a). 
11 
The error concerning constructive possession should have been 
obvious in light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a 
trial court's duty and a defendant's right "to have his theory of 
the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." 
Potter, 627 P. 2d at 78. Further, the error that resulted was 
harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately 
considering the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the 
case. 
B, Conspiracy Instruction 
In its Brief, the State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective 
assistance challenge to the lack of a conspiracy elements 
instruction fails because he provides no evidentiary support for 
his claim. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 24-27. The State's 
argument is without merit for the reasons set forth below. 
To convict Mr. Terry of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors 
and/or Equipment as set forth in Counts I and II of the 
Information, the jury had to find that the State had proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry "[k]nowingly or intentionally; 
. . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; AND/OR . . . 
[c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine 
12 
laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94) .12 According to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-201 (2002) , "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, 
intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of 
the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy . . . ." 
Trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction that 
accurately defined the conspiracy element as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-201. In addition, trial counsel failed to 
request that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury so 
that Mr. Terry, as the accused, could determine which variation 
the jury relied upon in the course of convicting him of 
Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment. 
In State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1073, the State 
charged the defendant with unlawful clandestine laboratory 
operations, which included multiple variations of statutory 
criteria for conviction. Id. at 1|2 7. However, because no special 
verdict form was utilized, the Court determined that it was 
possible that the jury relied upon the subsection that includes 
all the elements for conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance precursor as a lesser included offense. Id. 
12A true and correct copy of Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 (R. 
92-94) are attached to the previously filed Brief of Appellant as 
Addendum G. 
13 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for 
precursor possession. See id. 
Contrary to the State's position, trial counsel's failure to 
propose a jury instruction that accurately defined the conspiracy 
element and the failure to request that a special verdict form be 
utilized by the jury fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing Utah case law, statutory criteria, and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would 
have been different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been 
convicted of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment as a first-degree felony. Had a 
special verdict form been requested and utilized, Mr. Terry would 
have been provided with notice of the variation relied upon by the 
jury in the course of convicting him under Counts I and II of the 
Information. In the event that the jury had relied upon the 
conspiracy variation, which would have been revealed by way of the 
special verdict form, the conviction would have been reduced to a 
second-degree felony or one classification pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-202(2) (2002). 
14 
C, Intent Instruction 
The State argues that Mr. Terry's ineffective assistance 
challenge to the intent instruction fails because the statute 
merely identifies factors a jury may consider in determining 
intent. Notwithstanding, the State fails to rebut Mr. Terry's 
argument, which is based on established Utah case law, requiring 
the jury to be instructed with respect to all the legal elements 
that it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so charged. 
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Before the jury could convict Mr. Terry of Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment as set forth in Counts I 
and II of the Information, it had to find that the State had 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry " [k]nowingly or 
intentionally; . . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor 
with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
AND/OR . . . [c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94). Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002) specifically designates the circumstances 
under which the jury, as the trier of fact, may infer that a 
defendant intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation. That provision states: 
The trier of fact may infer that the 
defendant intended to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation if the defendant: 
15 
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled 
substance precursor; or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to 
illegally possess a controlled substance 
precursor and is in possession of any one of 
the following pieces of equipment: 
(a) glass reaction vessel; 
(b) separatory funnel; 
(c) glass condenser; 
(d) analytical balance; or 
(e) heating mantle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002) . 
The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury 
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of 
the elements and relevant law fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, which is demonstrated existing 
Utah case law, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6, and the underlying 
factual circumstances of the case. But for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr. 
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment. This is 
particularly applicable in light of the foregoing ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error arguments. 
The jury must be instructed as to all the legal elements that 
it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so charged -- the 
absence of which is reversible error. State v. Jones, 823 P. 2d 
1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 
(Utah 1980)); see also State v. Roberts, 111 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 
16 
1985) (stating that "[t]he general rule is that an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential.") . 
The trial court plainly erred by failing to completely and 
accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable to the legal 
element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II of the 
Information. 
This error was obvious in light of the trial court's 
obligation to so instruct the jury, which is well-established by 
Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's duty. The 
resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from 
completely and accurately considering all the elements of the 
charges set forth in Count I and II of the Information. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Terry respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the 
case to the trial court for a new trial or, in the alternative, 
that this Court reverse Mr. Terry's convictions and enter judgment 
for the lesser included offenses together with any relief the 
17 
Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances of the 
case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 2 0 t h d a y o ^ M a r c h , 2 0 0 6 . 
&\WIG<3INS, P . C . 
l g g w i s 
e y s fc^TT^pellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this 21st 
day of March, 2 0 06: 
Ms. Karen A. Klucznik 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Uf 8^1^-0^54 
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ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24 (a) (11) . 
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